Introduction
Kant claims that human cognition involves the peculiar ability to "think the particular as contained under the universal." We generalize: we abstract, classify, or conceptualize; we think of particular individual things as belonging to general kinds: this is a bird, that a tree. We form concepts into systematic hierarchies: grizzlies and polar bears are kinds of bear; bears and dogs are kinds of mammal; and so on. Similarly we can consider an abstract feature, such as 'redness', which we have encountered in many different individual experiences, and apply it to other objects: this apple is red, that balloon is red. In Kant's terminology these are examples of judgment: the mental act of applying general concepts to particulars. This act, for Kant, involves the coordination of two mental abilities, identified in his Critique of Pure Reason as "understanding" and "imagination" respectively. In his Critique of Judgment Kant adds a new development to this theory. In the course of an analysis of judgments of beauty, Kant argues that an internal signal (of pleasure) accompanies the coordination of imagination and understanding in judging. This signal is found, he argues, not only in the purely "aesthetic judgment" of beauty but also in cognition (Kant, 1790 (Kant, /1987 . Kant here appears to propose nothing less than an additional sense, one not devoted to processing external sensory inputs, nor internal bodily signals such as balance, hunger, and so forth, but instead reporting on the processing state of the mind itself. He argues that such a signal is a prerequisite of cognition. While Kant's argument is purely philosophical, I take it his conclusion can also yield an empirical hypothesis, amenable to empirical investigation. Namely, is there any such signal in the mental processing leading to cognition? If such a signal exists, could its locus in the brain be identified? Below, I describe a candidate neuronal substrate for such a signal, and summarize ongoing experimental studies testing this idea in animal learning. I end by noting some questions raised in Kant's analysis of the human situation. For Kant's concern here is broader than the use of concepts and empirical laws already in our possession: it also concerns their discovery, formulation, and organization into a coherent system in the scientific investigation of nature. 1
Kant's basic theory of cognition 2.1 Metaphysical and epistemological background
In his account of cognition, Kant opposes the empiricist view that all mental contents are drawn from experience. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant famously introduced the notion of "a priori conditions" of cognition which, he argued, cannot be derived from experience but must instead be given prior to it. 2 Certain aspects of our knowledge of the world, he argued, are not based on but are instead put into our experience of the world by the mind, in constructing our mental representations of an objective world. 3 His theory identifies two basic kinds of conditions: two "a priori pure forms" of space and of time, and twelve original "a priori pure concepts" (such as "substance", "quantity", and "cause"); these were to be regarded as a priori constraints of thought rather than results of investigation or experience like a posteriori, empirical concepts such as "water". 4 Kant intended his position to solve certain metaphysical problems like the applicability of mathematics to nature and a defense of "cause" from Hume's attack. Our knowledge of three-dimensional Euclidean space is not based on experience of objects; rather, in order to represent an object in the first place, the mind arranges given sensory material into the three spatial dimensions. The world we experience conforms to the formal structures of Euclidean geometry because we construct it as such. 5 Similarly, Kant holds we do not look to the natural world to discover the concept of cause (which Hume pointed out could be neither deductively nor inductively grounded); rather, we presume the world is causally connected, and the project of science is to look for what those causes may be. "Cause" is thus an a priori concept. Hereafter, however, we will be concerned with ordinary, a posteriori concepts, and their use in cognition.
The theory
Kant was by no means an empirical psychologist; his cognitive theory was motivated by epistemological and metaphysical concerns like those sketched above. 6 At the same time I think it worthwhile to inquire into the potential neurobiological substrates of the functions he identifies. A basic sketch of the theory Kant gives in the Critique of Pure Reason follows. Take first the case of object recognition. Kant holds the mental representation of some given external object is by no means a direct "copy" of the sensible impressions, as held by the earlier empiricist philosophers. To the contrary, Kant argued that data received through the senses -the "manifold" of sensory material, as he termed itmust be transformed into our cognition of an object, through the constructive work of two further mental capacities beyond the sensory. These he called the "imagination" and "understanding" respectively (see e.g. pp. A78/B103; pp. A120-121; p. A126).
KANT AND THE BRAIN 2 2 Kant here uses the traditional philosophical distinction between "a posteriori" knowledge, as based on or derived from experience, versus "a priori" knowledge, regarded as not based on experience but known independently thereof. The classic examples are mathematical and logical: "how many coins are in the tip jar?" is to be answered a posteriori, by examining the jar in question; "what is the sum of seven plus five?" is not properly answered by empirical investigations but is supposedly determined a priori. Note traditionally "a priori" was considered to be quite distinct from merely "innate" in a psychological sense, as instincts or drives are innate. In what sense and how mathematics thus "transcends the contingent" is an open question today.
The imagination and construction in intuition
In Kant's theory, what he calls "the imagination" has the interpretive task of taking up received sensory material, and arranging it in space and in time. Taking space first, the given sensory material -visual, tactile, etc -has to be organized or arranged into specific three-dimensional shapes, and located at a specific location or place within the one unique, continuous space that we take all actual physical objects to occupy. A cartoon example might be helpful in highlighting the role of the imagination here: the well-known "Necker cube". The Necker cube line figure has two natural interpretations when taken as a three-dimensional shape: either of two different squares can be taken as the "front" face of a cube (Fig.1) .
Note that the perceptual system does not need to determine, based on the sensory input, how many dimensions any actual physical object is supposed to occupy: we presume it is in three-dimensional space. In Kant's view this three-dimensionality of all objects of experience is determined a priori; current thought regards this as likely to be an inherited constraint on perceptual processing. On the other hand, the particular shape of the object, within the three-dimensional constraint, is something that the viewer must determine on the basis of the given data (in this case, the lines drawn).
Kant emphasizes that the received sensory material must be arranged in time as well as in space (Fig. 2) . As he points out, the incoming sensory stream is always successive; this merely "subjective" succession may be reconstructed as views of an enduring thing (an object) or taken as a proper temporal sequence or ongoing event (an "objective" succession). Furthermore, as with space, Kant points out, there is but one time, in which all events are taken to occur.
Kant of course had access to no such studies, but A.L. Yarbus's classic work tracing visual saccades (eye movements) can give a sense of the fantastic complexity of the incoming sensory stream of data facing the task of constructing representations of stable objects. Yarbus tracked subjects' eye movements as they examined an image. The saccade traces range irregularly over the area of the examined object, returning frequently to key features (see Fig. 3 ). Clearly the eye is not like a camera; it has a constantly shifting field of view as it moves, and it is normally in near-constant motion during vision (long movements punctuated by brief moments of fixation). Yet the experienced object -the constructed perception -is of a stable, enduring object, not a constantly changing collection of inputs. Video from head-mounted cameras also give some idea of the complexity of the incoming visual data stream; the bobbing and weaving characteristic of such video streams is quite disorienting in the absence of the vestibular and other information normally used by the brain to stabilize the resulting perception.
Kant thus argued that imagination is involved in all perception, not just (as in the colloquial use of the term) the ability to recall previouslyexperienced scenes or objects or construct "imaginary" ones. He also took imagination to involve all sensory modalities, not just visual. Different sensory modalities are united in the perception of an object: as you taste your morning coffee, you see the cup and the steam; you feel the weight and the smoothness of the porcelain, and the heat, the scent, and the taste of the coffee itself. According to Kant, this unification ultimately requires concepts, to which we turn in the next section.
Kant's technical term for the spatiotemporalized sensory materials, as produced by the imagination, is Anschauung, translated "intuition." This is quite distinct from the lay use of the term in English, meaning something like "hunch" or "gut feeling." For Kant the term "intuition" has nothing to do with hunches or feelings, but refers to the spatiotemporalized sensory material produced by imagination; thus we may refer to the sensible intuition of the glass of milk, that of the cup of coffee, that of the table covered by cloth, or that of the scene as a whole. The imagination produces a "sensible intuition" from given sensory materials by arranging them in space and time. Similarly, Kant calls the "pure a priori forms" of space and time postulated in his theory "the pure forms of intuition".
We have seen Kant argues perception requires active reconstruction in space and in time; it will also require concepts, discussed below. Studies of the neurobiological substrates of vision have begun to identify such functions in brain. Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982; see Fig. 4 ) showed that spatial location (i.e. "where") is processed in the so-called "dorsal stream," proceeding from early visual sensory areas in occipital cortex to dorsal areas of posterior parietal cortex, while object shape is probably in the "ventral stream" proceeding from early visual areas to infero-temporal cortex, which subserves object recognition (i.e. "what"). The neuronal bases of time perception -both elapsed time (duration) and location in universal historical time -are not yet well understood. Cannabinoids are known to distort time perception; basal ganglia and cerebellum have been implicated in timing; perception of elapsed time is reported to involve areas in parietal cortex and attentional systems (Iversen, 2001; Harrington et al, 1998; Eagleman et al, 2005) .
The task of the imagination, then, is to take the raw sensory material provided by the senses, and arrange it in space and in time. Kant's recognition that the three-dimensional shapes and locations of sensed objects, and their time order as enduring or successive, are not simply already given by the sensory input but must be reconstructed via active representational processes, represents a considerable advance over the views of his contemporaries.
The understanding, or, the home of concepts
So far we have discussed imagination, but for Kant cognition also requires an appropriate concept, provided by "the understanding" (p. A78/B103). Kant emphasizes that neither the intuition alone, nor the concept alone, suffice; both are needed. The cartoons in Figure 5A may help to highlight the conceptual contribution. Wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" illustration and other examples can be interpreted in different ways, depending on the concept chosen. The point of such examples is not in the illusion per se, but simply to bring our attention not only to the imagination's spatiotemporal reconstruction of given materials, but also to the point that this activity is guided by the concept used in recognizing just what it is. Thus the construction of an objective perception cannot be merely a sequential, assembly-line process; there must be feedback and coordination between imagination and understanding. As the great nineteenth-century physicist and physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz (who was deeply influenced by Kant) put it, perceptions are "inductive conclusions, unconsciously formed" (Helmholtz, 1867 (Helmholtz, /1925 quoted in Barlow, 2001 ). Both concept and intuition (ie spatiotemporally arranged sensory material) are required for any mental content to qualify as objective "cognition"; as Kant famously put it, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (p. A51/B75).
Kant considers the understanding to be the home of universal or general terms; this includes concepts as well as other universal generalizations, including statements of natural laws. We began with object recognition, but Kant considers more complex judgments. In object recognition, e.g, you are in a boat, and see a shape under the water; with a sense of relief you recognize a dolphin. Or, you may learn "Whales are mammals." This statement (what philosophers call a "proposition") is itself a judgment, i.e. an act of thinking the particular under the universal. Kant points out that a judgment like this actually involves "a representation of a representation" (p. A68/B93): the predicate (the general term "mammal") is applied to the subject-term "whales", which serves for it as a 'particular' thought as falling under the universal; while "whales" is again itself a general term thought as applied to various potential sensible intuitions. (There are also logically singular terms, as in the statement "Socrates is mortal"; here too the subject-term "Socrates" is applied to something located in space and in time, which is thought as falling under the universal "mortal".) Finally, the above discussed judgments use concepts already in one's repertoire; a further kind of judgment, which is an important topic of the Critique of Judgment, to be discussed below, is the discovery or formulation of new empirical generalizations such as "mammal."
As noted, a key implication of Kant's account is that the construction in intuition must aim at being subsumed under an appropriate concept. Although there is no evidence Kant would be aware of the phenomenon, his account naturally accommodates the well-known playing card experiments of Bruner and Postman in the late 1940's (reported in Kuhn, 1962) . In these experiments, subjects were asked to identify playing cards given short but increasing (10 -1000 milliseconds)
presentations. At shorter presentations, subjects report they do not recognize the image but nonetheless 'guess' correctly (the minimum threshold varied among subjects). However, some of the cards were incongruous: the suit color was altered so that e.g. a red spade or a black heart was presented. On shorter presentations all subjects 'misidentified' the anomalous cards, fitting the perceived color to an already-existing category (e.g. red spades reported as hearts); on the longer presentations, up to 1000 milliseconds, most -but not all -subjects eventually recognized the anomaly. The subjects began to exhibit distress while viewing the anomalous cards -evidently feeling that something was wrong, but not sure what -until the anomaly was consciously recognized. These experiments illustrate the influence on the construction of the mental representation (in Kant's terms, the "sensible intuition", i.e. spatiotemporalized sensory material) according to the concept used to determine what it is -in this case, even when some features are contradicted by the actual sensory data if presented fleetingly enough (although Kant did not himself suggest this latter possibility). While in brain it is not yet well understood how this influence is exerted, it is clear that it exists. People fill in expected perceptual details, according to what (kind, type, sort) the thing is thought to be. Kant emphasizes this is not only a matter of combining the several different senses (what is sometimes termed "the binding problem") but combining and separating, as appropriate, the manifold of data within each sensory stream. This "manifold" of sensory data, which involves not only multiple senses (visual, auditory, taste, touch, etc) but also a multitude of sensory material within each sensory stream, needs to be unified into a single stable perception of a scene (objects and/or events). In Kant's view, this act of unification requires the use of concepts. Look at the coffee cup on your desk: the visual data from the cup must be separated from those of the table surface, and combined together as belonging to the one object, perhaps with the scent of coffee and anticipation of its taste as well; the table's sensory data likewise bound together and perceived as a unitary object (see Fig. 5B for a similar example). In both cases, this separation and grouping requires the application of the appropriate concept. And both table and cup are placed within a unique location in all of space, and in all of time.
Kant actually considers this unity of perception or thought to stem from the unity of consciousness itself, and that from "the possibility of the 'I think' ", i.e. the representation of a self (pp. B131-136). Searle (1997) , with his usual dryness, speaks of Kant's flair for catchy phrases in his calling this the "transcendental unity of apperception". The neuroscientists Gerald Edelman and Antonio Damasio discuss the role of the representation of the self in perception (Edelman, 2004 , Damasio, 2000 ; these are important questions, which we can not pursue here.
Neurobiological substrates
Kant's views deeply affected the 19th century founders of neuroscience (Helmholtz being an especially clear example), and have ready correspondences in contemporary ideas about how the cortex creates representations of objects and sequences in the environment. What follows is necessarily quite simplified, 7 but it appears that "universalizing" functions would be subserved in more anterior cortical regions, and "particulars" in more posterior regions, where sensory inputs first arrive in cortex. This general and widely accepted hypothesis is summarized in Figure 6 (the region anterior to primary motor cortex, broadly corresponding to 'frontal cortex' -an area vastly expanded in human brain -is here referred to as 'anterior cortex'). Work in the past century has shown that each distinct sensory modality (vision, touch, etc) inputs to its own distinct primary sensory area within the posterior cortex, cascades through further stages of processing in secondary areas, and eventually converges in the so-called "association areas" of cortex, which thus receive multiple sensory modalities. At the same time there are extensive recurrent connections among the cortical areas: each stage of processing is not merely sequential, as in an assembly line, but involves recurrent connections from secondary sensory areas and association areas (Fig. 6A ). As mentioned above, for example, it appears that visual recognition of complex objects is at least in part subserved in inferotemporal cortex (the "what" pathway) while primary processing of specific cue features (edge-detection, motion, color) are accomplished at earlier stages. The feedback influence of higher-level conceptual representations on lower levels of sensory processing proposed in the Kantian model, and evident in the playing card experiments, would be well subserved by the massive recurrent connections observed between higher association cortex regions and earlier sensory cortical regions. This implies that a conscious perception would involve regions of activation distributed across different regions of cortex, as has been suggested by a number of neuroscientists. (Singer and colleagues have identified recurrent synchronous firing in the gamma band, around 40 Hz, as a correlate of conscious perception (Engel and Singer 2001) , while Edelman's theory of "functional clustering" of activations across distinct neuronal groups addresses the issue of the integration and differentiation, or unity in diversity, of mental contents (Tononi & Edelman, 1998) .)
Anterior association regions, sampling the output of the posterior (sensory) association zones, feed back into them (Fig. 6B) and are assumed to provide the rules whereby the encoding of 'what' occurs in those latter areas. In the human brain, the anterior-posterior relationship is further evident in the processing of words and their assembly into sentences via the rules of grammar. The development of language means that concepts are associated with words, which can be used in statements. It is well known that two normally left-cortex areas are language related: Wernicke's area, located more posteriorly, subserves content and comprehension, while Broca's area, located more anteriorily, relates to syntax and sequencing of thoughts. Damage to Wernicke's area, near the junction of temporal and posterior parietal cortex, yields difficulties in comprehension and in speech production that is syntactically fluent but incoherent (i.e. the patient uses words in fluent sentences but the content does not make sense). Damage to Broca's area, in the frontal cortex and near motor systems, produces speech that has relevant content words, but little or no syntactical structure. Propositional judgments can not be expressed if this anterior language center is sufficiently damaged.
Finally, it is clear the brain must somehow generalize on the basis of experience. For simple stimuli and responses this can be understood in a fairly mechanical fashion; e.g. the entire neuronal circuit for eyeblink conditioning has been traced (i.e. the circuit responsible for the conditioned response of eyeblink to an auditory tone previously repeatedly paired with an air puff to the eye). But the brain is capable of far more sophisticated generalizations. In Kant's terms, judgment organizes the contents of new experience, according to extant or, sometimes, new concepts (a red spade!). But the question arises as to how the recurrent cycling of activity among anterior and posterior cortical association areas results in a neuronal 'decision' that an appropriate representation of 'what' has been attained. This is a profoundly difficult question for brain theories and, as discussed below, is one Kant belatedly realized was faced by his own system.
New developments in the Critique of Judgment
Like much of Kant's work the Critique of Judgment is notoriously difficult, and has inspired considerable scholarly controversy over its interpretation. Where the first Critique proposed a set of a priori conditions of our representation of objects, the third Critique discusses the a posteriori side of cognition. In the search for empirical laws and concepts, Kant notes in the Introduction to the latter work, we systematize our empirical knowledge, and he points out we must assume there are suitable generalizations to be found -that nature is not too chaotic or random to be comprehended at all. (We can only assume this: this is not something we can conclude on the basis of having already found such regularities, for it is induction itself that is at issue). In this search, we are looking for appropriate generalizations to capture or describe given particulars (the data or phenomena to be explained). In the Critique of Judgment Kant also describes his discovery, in the course of an analysis of aesthetic judgments, of an additional mental ability regarding the relation between the generalizing and particularizing aspects of cognition: a sense or feeling of their accordance. I sketch Kant's aesthetic theory below.
Kant's account of beauty
Kant's account of the judgment of beauty is given in terms of his account of the mental powers at work in ordinary cognition. Instead of subsuming particulars under concepts as ordinary cognitive judgments do, Kant claims that a judgment of beauty feels a pleasure directly in the mind's presentation of the object. What does he mean by this?
Let's start with an example. You find yourself facing a desert landscape, an intricately patterned seashell, or a Van Gogh painting depicting almond blossoms against a blue sky. You stand before it, gazing, lost in contemplation. What is happening here, according to Kant? 8 In the Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that the same mental processes employed in ordinary cognition are engaged in aesthetic contemplation, except in this case, their activity is not directed at cognition but is instead "free". Of course you recognize, cognitively, what the painting depicts: tree branches with almond flowers, the blue sky behind. As we saw this involves arranging the given sensory materials in space and time (both as an actual object -a painting -at a particular location in actual space and time; and at another level as a picture of almond branches, etc), and subsumption under the appropriate concepts. But aesthetically, something else is going on. Insofar as the object is cognized as a thing of a particular kind, the organization chosen depends on the concept; here the imagination is not free, Kant asserts: "when the imagination is used for cognition, then it is under the constraint of the understanding, and is subject to the restriction of adequacy to the understanding's concept" (p. 316). By contrast, in the experience of beauty, Kant claims, we find that the imagination has a freedom it does not possess in the ordinary case: "the cognitive powers brought into play by this presentation [of a beautiful object] are in free play, because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition" (p. 217). In free play, "a judgment of taste does not subsume [a presentation] under any concept at all" (p. 286). Instead, in free play the imagination can come up with combinations of the manifold into intuitions that it would not be free to produce when adapting to some concept of the understanding; in free play the imagination is "productive and spontaneous [and is] the originator of chosen forms of possible intuitions" (p. 240). These combinations and relations found by the imagination need not make cognitive sense: for example, in the Matisse painting "The Red Room", the pattern on the tablecloth is repeated in, and seems to merge with, the wallpaper; or again, the shape of the woman's hairdo is echoed in the shape of the trees outside the window. These are aesthetically-pleasing repetitions but do not make cognitive sense. It all makes aesthetic sense and the painting as a whole has an aesthetic unity; the understanding finds these connections thrown up by the imagination suggestive and thought-provoking, but there is no one interpretation or description which could finally capture (and in that sense substitute for) the experience of the beautiful object itself. The imagination finds aesthetically pleasing patterns, and this stimulates the understanding, and the understanding stimulates the imagination in turn; this is free play of the cognitive powers. The two powers in their free play, Kant holds, "reciprocally quicken each other" (p. 287); in free play "the imagination is free when it arouses the understanding, and the understanding, without using concepts, puts the imagination into a play that is regular [i.e. cognitive powers, which normally results in subsuming an intuition produced by the imagination under a determinate concept of the understanding, i.e. in a cognitive judgment, in free play instead resonates and continues, in "a play which is such that it sustains itself on its own and even strengthens the powers for such play" (p. 313). This is the "facilitated free play of the two mental powers (imagination and understanding) quickened by their reciprocal harmony" (p. 219). Finally, this activity of the mental powers is felt, Kant claims, .
Note that exactly what aesthetic unity consists in is hard to say: Kant denies it can be captured by concepts. Verbal descriptions (like those above) of certain aesthetically pleasing aspects of a natural beauty, poem, or painting, are cognitive judgments, not themselves experiences of beauty. Such efforts, Kant notes, can at best serve to point others in the right direction, to call their attention in hopes of awakening their own aesthetic judgments.
In a judgment of beauty the imagination does not produce merely random or chaotic connections of the manifold of sense, but rather ones that reflect a certain unstateable unity or unities (Kant even calls it a "free lawfulness"). But it does so freely, without any constraint of determinate rules or concepts. What this means is that we have a capacity to feel a certain unity in the given sensory diversity, an order, connection, or coherence that isn't (or isn't yet) captured by any explicit rule or concept.
The experience of beauty, then, is the pleasure one takes in one's own mental activity in apprehending an object, and doing so freely, without the normal constraints of taking it cognitively. Thus I take it that an activity of imagination and understanding needed for all cognition is found in its purest form in the experience of beauty: the imagination searches for connections in the material offered to it, and the understanding is stimulated by this in its own attempts to codify, formulate, and formalize. In beauty, of course, Kant holds, this never settles down into a final stable form; the truly beautiful object always offers material for fresh contemplation. In beauty, likewise, the search is unconstrained by cognitive restrictions, while in cognition it is thus constrained (especially logical consistency). At the same time beauty is neither random nor chaotic.
In his analysis of judgments of beauty, then, Kant argues there must be a "common inner sense": a feeling of the coordination of the imagination and understanding in judgment. He argues this feeling is also found in cognition (indeed, that we must assume the sense is shared by everyone, in order to avoid skepticism). Rather than external sensory cues, Kant's common inner sense, it appears, is to report on the processing state of the mind itself, in acts of judging. Now to our experimental question: Is there such a signal in the brain processing leading to cognition? If so can its locus in brain be identified? Some experiments directed toward these questions are described below.
Empirical work
As we saw, one would expect potential neurobiolobigical substrates of Kantian "universals" to be subserved in more anterior cortical areas, in frontal and temporal association areas, and "particulars" in more posterior cortical regions, where sensory inputs arrive and begin to be processed. Is there a potential neurobiological substrate for the Kantian inner sense, as well? Can we identify a brain region that subserves feeling and is in a position to signal the occurrence of coordinated activity between these regions? Figure  8 shows the desiderata: a brain substrate for Kantian "inner sense", not an outer sense like sight or hearing but a feeling of the mind's (or here the brain's) activity, in a position to report on coordinated activity between anterior associational regions in frontal cortex and the posterior cortical associational and sensory regions.
I would like to suggest a particular region of the limbic system that appears to offer a good fit with the above two criteria: the basolateral division of the amygdala. The amygdala as a whole is an evolutionarily ancient subcortical structure, in humans located at the anterior ventral pole of the hippocampal formation. The most well-studied division of the amygdala is its central nucleus. The central nucleus is known to subserve a particular kind of feeling signal: it is well established as a substrate for fear and anxiety responses. While fear itself is not the signal that we are interested in -to the contrary, we are interested in a feeling of pleasure -it is certainly a feeling-signal that reaches consciousness. Could a different division of the amygdala be a potential substrate of the pleasurable and cognitive signal of the sort Kant suggests?
In fact, the basolateral division of the amygdala has extensive reciprocal connections across cortex. As such it appears well positioned to report on the occurrence of coordinated activity between anterior and posterior cortical regions. Figure 9 shows a diagram of some major inputs and outputs of the basolateral divsion of the amygdgala -that is, the lateral nucleus and the anterior division of the basolateral nucleus, what Swanson and Petrovich (1998) identify as the frontotemporal system of the amygdala. (There is some ambiguity in the nomenclature; I use "basolateral division" or "basolateral amygdala" to include both the lateral nucleus and the anterior basolateral nucleus of the amygdala). Note the extensive, reciprocal connectivity with frontal and temporal cortical regions shown by the basolateral amygdala.
For both these reasons, the basolateral division of the amygdala seems well positioned to signal the occurrence of synchronized, coordinated activity between frontal/temporal and posterior cortical regions.
Basolateral amygdala thus appears to be a suitable candidate both in terms of connectivity and as a potential substrate for a feeling signal reaching consciousness.
Experimental tests of this idea
A set of recent learning studies in rats (Hess, Gall, Granger, & Lynch, 1997) are promising in regard to the hypothesis of the basolateral amygdala as a potential substrate of a cognitive signal on the Kantian model. Figure 10 shows sections from rat brains through amygdala under two different behavioral conditions. The basolateral division is highly active in one of these conditions: when the animal has just learned something new.
In the studies, rats were trained on a two-odor discrimination task: a rat must learn to poke its nose into one of two ports, marked with distinct odors, to receive a water reward (they have had temporarily limited access to water prior to the experiments). When a rat has first learned the correct odor cue (it begins to nosepoke only to the correct port), the basolateral division of the amygdala shows marked activation, the researchers discovered. Remarkably, they found the basolateral division is not active when the animal is engaged in the identical overt behavior later, after the task has been well-learned. Nor was it active earlier, when the animal is in the same apparatus and nosepoking, but before it has learned to choose only the correct odor. (It is also not active in "home cage" control animals.) It thus appears that the basolateral division activity correlates with the condition that something new has been learned -in Figure 9 . Major connections of the "frontotemporal" amygdala in rat, adapted from Swanson and Petrovich 1998. Note the extensive bidirectional connectivity of the anterior basolateral nucleus (BLA) with frontal cortex in particular, and of lateral amygdala (LA) with temporal cortex. Additional cortical regions with reciprocal connections to BLA and LA are indicated.
(Outputs of both to the striatal system and directly or indirectly to other amygdalar nuclei, and input from perigeniculate thalamus, also indicated). Figure 10 . Basolateral amygdala activation in new learning. In situ hybridization to c-fos mRNA is used as a marker of neuronal activity. Left: Central nucleus (arrow) is active in this brain; this rat had been lightly stressed by being given an injection for the first time. Right: Basolateral division of the amygdala (arrow) shows distinct activation. This rat had newly learned a two-odor discrimination task. Courtesy of Christine Gall.
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other words, just when the animal has "figured it out". These results are encouraging for the hypothesis of the basolateral amygdala as a potential substrate for a cognitive signal. Further studies are currently underway. The above studies, like most animal learning studies, involve the presence of an externally-provided reward cue to shape the animal's behavior. Such reward-(or punishment-) based learning is classified as "supervised" learning, meaning learning based on the presence of external rewards (or punishments) for correct or incorrect responses. We would like to examine unsupervised learning as well, that is, learning in the absence of any such explicit reward or punishment. Much human learning and discovery is of this sort.
Consider stepping off a train in an unfamiliar city (or to take a less romantic example, consider walking into a brand-new shopping mall). Exploration of a novel environment is a standard mammalian behavior. Well-handled, unstressed rats placed in a novel environment will spontaneously explore it, and learn objects and locations in the environment. Spontaneous exploration of a novel environment is an example of an "unsupervised learning" paradigm, for there is no explicit external reward signal to shape the animal's learning.
At this point a question may be raised concerning Kant's focus on human cognition. Kant's theory involves conceptual subsumption, but it is unknown to what extent rats have anything similar. In response to this question, a two-part assumption underlying the present experiments should be outlined. The first assumption is this: in spontaneous exploration, the animals are engaged in the detection and encoding of regularities in the environment. Along these lines, Horace Barlow emphasizes the exploitation of statistical regularities in the environment by the brain, citing Helmholtz's view that perceptions are "inductive conclusions unconsciously formed", and Craik's and Tolman's ideas of symbolic models or cognitive maps (respectively); these are based on environmental regularities, which must be detected and encoded by the brain (Barlow, 2001; Helmholtz, 1925; Craik, 1943; Tolman, 1948) .
The second part of the assumption in the present context, then, is this: that the detection and encoding of regularities is both an evolutionary precursor to, and a prerequisite for, the higher level conceptual subsumption found in human cognition. Kant's hypothesis is that a signal is required for the latter; perhaps it is also required and can be found in the former.
In the present studies, a well-handled rat is placed in a novel environment and allowed to explore; this contains local cues, an enclosed "refuge", and clear walls (see Fig. 11 ). After an initial period of exploration in this apparatus, rats exhibit a new behavior: holding still in or near the entry to the refuge, in a posture of alert observation. We propose that the appearance of this behavior may serve as a behavioral marker that learning has taken place. We predict that activation of the basolateral amygdala will be a necessary concomitant of the unsupervised learning in this paradigm. These experiments are currently under way, and we await the results of the analysis of the amygdala activation patterns. (We have preliminary results of these studies in another brain area (Palmer 2007) : briefly, a characteristic activity pattern seen in the hippocampus at the time of initial learning in the supervised learning studies, is also seen in the unsupervised learning studies at the time of the alert observation behavior. This result is consistent with the proposal that the behavior can serve as a marker of learning.)
While we do not yet have the results in amygdala of the above-described unsupervised learning studies in animals, recent fMRI work in human beings is promising with regard to the present hypothesis. Volz and von Cramon of the Max Planck Instutite for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig, Germany, recently used functional magnetic imaging to study human subjects engaged in a gestalt closure task, a task the authors describe as involving a "context of discovery" (Volz & von Cramon, 2006) . They 
Introduction
Subfields of hippocampus form a densely connected serial network:
entorhinal cortex dentate gyrus field CA3 field CA1 output via subiculum Thus a natural prediction would be that CA1 activity levels will correlate closely with activity in CA3, its major input. Yet earlier work has shown that relative activity levels in CA3 and CA1 in fact change substantially, during acquisition of rewarded behaviors (Hess et al. 1995a,b; Gall et al 1998) .
Here we tested if this result also holds for unsupervised learning: ie learning in the absence of explicit external reward or punishment.
Rats placed in an open field with an attached refuge were found to adopt, after initial intense exploration, a posture of alert observation on the border of the two domains (lasting tens of seconds to minutes) before resuming exploration.
This learning-related change in behavior was accompanied by a dramatic shift in the balance of activity between fields CA3 and CA1, as assessed by in situ hybridization to c-fos mRNA: in rats sacrificed to measure peak mRNA levels at time of the observational behavior, CA1 showed relatively low activity levels with higher levels in CA3. This is the same hippocampal activity pattern seen in the earlier studies of rewarded learning.
Results in rats sacrificed to measure neuronal activity while exploring the apparatus corresponded to a distinct pattern earlier shown in rats exploring a novel environment, namely labeling in both CA3 and CA1 with CA1 slightly predominant.
These results:
• confirm acquisition is associated with a particular change in the pattern of neuronal activity in hippocampus: CA1 < CA3 • extend this observation to include unsupervised learning • indicate the pertinent changes occur within minutes
We hypothesize that the observed changes reflect the formation within field CA1 of "winner-take-all" modules, a learning-related effect seen in certain neural network models.
Methods
Animals: 6 week old male Long-Evans rats; handled for four days prior to testing, including daily transport in opaque cages to the behavioral laboratory.
Test apparatus: 18-by 36-inches with clear glass sides, two local cue objects (2 inch high glass bottles), and an enclosed refuge box: visually opaque (dark inside) but transparent to infrared illumination. Various distal cues are visible in the dimly lit testing room. Infrared LED illuminators allowed an overhead network video camera (Axis Communications AB, Lund, Sweden) to track animals while inside the refuge.
Behavioral sessions and treatment groups: A rat was placed near the entry of the refuge and allowed to explore at will, monitored for occurrence of the first 'alert observation' behavior (AOB) > ~ 45s, and sacrificed to measure peak c-fos levels induced by neuronal activity as follows: at time of AOB occurrence; or 15m or 30m prior to AOB (ie during active exploration). Control animals remained in the transport box until removed for sacrifice. Brains were fresh-frozen. For each group n=3 except the 15 min group (n=2): 11 rats total. AOB was defined as the animal's sitting, alert but motionless (excepting occasional head scanning movements) near the entry of the refuge for a period of > 40 seconds, excluding grooming, local exploration and sleeping.
In situ hybridization to c-fos mRNA: Levels of c-fos mRNA are low at background and rise quickly after neuronal activity, peaking at about 30 min. 20!m thick brain sections were sectioned in a cryostat onto glass slides and processed for in situ hybridization to a 35S-labeled cRNA probe complementary to rat c-fos mRNA (i.e., to positions 583-1520 of clone pc-fos (rat)-1 by Curran et al. 1987) , as described in earlier work (Gall et al. 1990 (Gall et al. , 1998 Guthrie et al. 1996; Lauterborn et al. 1996; Palmer et al. 1997) . Kodak Biomax MR film was exposed to sections for 3 days yielding film autoradiograms of hybridization density; commercial radiographic standards (American Radiolabelled Chemicals, Inc., St. Louis, MO) exposed along with the tissue calibrate optical density measures to microcuries per gram (!Ci/g) mRNA protein.
Autoradiographic analyses: Digital scans of film autoradiograms were analyzed using Object-Image (http://simon.bio.uva.nl/object-image.html). Hippocampal subfields CA3, CA2, and CA1 were sampled at every section obtained through rostral hippocampus, and two-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) calculated with the TukeyKramer test for post hoc comparisons; a 95% confidence interval was required to be considered significant (p < 0.05).
I. Behavior 2. In situ Hybridization: c-fos mRNA levels reflect neu
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• A constant width selection along the cell body layer is "unrolled" through CA3, CA2, CA1.
Mapping procedure schematic
• The procedure applied to diagrams of coronal sections from the atlas The Rat Brain in Stereotaxic Coordinates. 
CA1 relatively lower
suggest "people continuously . . . recognize patterns in the stream of sensations" and "detect potential content based on only a few aspects of the input (i.e. the gist)", and that this results in "a vague perception of coherence which is not explicitly describable but instead embodied in a 'gut feeling' or an initial guess, which subsequently biases thought and inquiry." In the gestalt closure task, the authors found median orbito-frontal cortex to be activated, as well as: the lateral portion of the amygdala, anterior insula, and ventral occipito-temporal regions. While the authors do not focus on lateral amygdala, we find these results quite encouraging with respect to the Kantian signal hypothesis.
Philosophical questions
Philosophers, if not practicing scientists, worry about the problem of induction: whenever human beings use or formulate an empirical natural law or general term, we assume the future will be like the past, and in general that a description of one portion of matter in space-time can be rightly applied to some other portion. There is no way of proving this assumption. (Pointing to the past success of inductive generalizations is no use, as that move itself relies on induction.) This was Hume's point regarding the concept of cause; Kant's response to Hume began in the Critique of Pure Reason, and continued in the Critique of Judgment. Now in the Critique of Judgment Kant describes "the principle of judgment" in two ways in different places in the text: as the "necessary assumption" that nature does exhibit regularities we may rightly generalize, and as the common inner sense that feels the coordination between the generalizing and the particularizing functions of the mind. The former description is part of his response to the problem of induction (that is, Kant is here spelling out what assumptions we must make, in doing induction). Is Kant then really suggesting that a feeling plays a role in induction?
I take it that he is. However, there is considerable controversy over the interpretation of Kant's notoriously difficult texts, and not all commentators would agree regarding what claims Kant is actually making, nor on the implications of his views. 9 In any event Kant's account raises a number of interesting philosophical and epistemological issues. If feeling plays a role in inductive judgments, what are the epistemological implications of such a view? If not, why does Kant describe "the principle of judgment" in both of these ways? Does the inner sense need development or training, and if so how? Kant actually raises this latter question: whether the common sense exists, or instead "must be produced"; in this case it would be, in his view, a rational demand or requirement that we strive to "produce such agreement in the way we sense." Kant's account raises fascinating issues which we unfortunately have not space to address here.
